Carvana Adds New Cars While Rivian Waits on Volume
Two very different auto names got flagged as overlooked on the same day: an EV maker still building scale and a used-car retailer stretching into new-vehicle sales.
Motley Fool on Sept. 23, 2026 named Rivian and Carvana as overlooked auto stocks, citing Rivian's early-stage story and Carvana's expansion into new-vehicle sales; RIVN last traded at 15.02, down 0.79%, and CVNA at 63.95, down 2.22%.
Two companies sit at opposite ends of the automotive value chain, and both closed lower on Wednesday alongside a weak broad tape. Rivian (RIVN) finished at 15.02, down 0.79% from a prior close of 15.14, inside a session range of 14.80 to 15.17. Carvana (CVNA) closed at 63.95, off 2.22% from 65.40, having traded as low as 62.15 and as high as 65.04. Both figures are as of the last trade at 20:00 GMT on Sept. 23, 2026, with the market closed.
The pairing comes from an argument laid out by Motley Fool, which framed both names as under-the-radar: Rivian because investors have written it off as being in the very early innings of its story, and Carvana because the market has not yet worked out what its move into new-vehicle sales is worth. Neither is an obscure ticker. What is being claimed is that the reason each one is cheap or ignored is a reason that expires.
Why "early innings" is a double-edged description
Calling a company early is a compliment and a warning in the same breath. For an electric-vehicle manufacturer, early means the plant is not yet running at the volume the fixed cost base was designed for. Every unit built before that point carries a heavier share of depreciation, tooling and overhead than it will later, which is why young automakers tend to look worse on gross margin than their eventual economics justify.
It also means the equity is a call option on execution rather than a claim on current cash flow. Investors who skip Rivian on the grounds that it is early are, in effect, saying they would rather pay more later for evidence than less now for a plan. That is a defensible position. It is also the position that, historically, has cost the most money when a manufacturer does clear the volume threshold.
The counterargument is equally simple. Early-stage vehicle makers consume capital at a rate that is not obvious from a headline valuation, and the ramp is where most of them fail. The relevant things to track are not analyst opinions but the physical ones: quarterly production, quarterly deliveries, the gap between the two, and whether unit economics improve as volume rises. Those are reported numbers. They arrive on a schedule. Until they do, the thesis is unresolved.
What changes when a used-car retailer starts selling new ones
Carvana built its business on used vehicles — sourcing, reconditioning, logistics, and a financing arm attached to the sale. Moving into new vehicles is a different trade, and the market's hesitation to reprice the stock for it is not irrational, because the mechanics genuinely differ.
Used-car retail is an inventory-sourcing game. The hard part is buying cars at the right price, and the margin lives in the spread between acquisition cost and retail price, plus whatever finance and ancillary products generate. New-vehicle retail is a distribution game. Supply comes from manufacturers, pricing is far more transparent to the buyer, and front-end margin per unit is typically thinner than on used inventory. What it offers instead is volume, predictable supply that does not depend on scouring auctions and trade-ins, and a customer relationship that can be monetized through financing and service over years.
For a company whose infrastructure is already built — the inspection centers, the vending-machine delivery network, the logistics fleet — additional units pushed through that fixed asset base is the argument. The question is whether the incremental unit economics on new vehicles are good enough to justify the capital and attention diverted from the used business, and whether franchise and manufacturer relationships allow the model to scale the way the used side did.
Two stocks, one sector, almost no shared risk
It is worth being precise about how little these two names have in common as investments. Rivian's outcome is determined by manufacturing: tooling, supply chain, battery cost, factory throughput. Carvana's is determined by retail and credit: inventory turns, cost of funds, loan performance, consumer demand for vehicles at whatever rates prevail.
Rivian's outcome is determined by manufacturing: tooling, supply chain, battery cost, factory throughput.
That means they respond to different macro variables. A used-car retailer with a financing arm is sensitive to interest rates and to consumer credit quality in a way a manufacturer building pre-order backlog is not. A manufacturer is exposed to component costs, tariffs and capital-markets access in a way a retailer is not. Owning both is not doubling down on "autos" in any meaningful sense; it is two separate bets that happen to involve the same physical object.
- Rivian's variables: production and delivery counts, gross margin per vehicle, cash burn, and the timeline to a volume model.
- Carvana's variables: retail units sold, the mix between new and used, gross profit per unit, and the health of its loan book.
- Shared variable: overall vehicle demand and the cost of financing a car purchase.
The tape they closed into
Wednesday was not a day that rewarded risk. The S&P 500 tracker (SPY) closed at $767.81, down 0.72% from $773.38, with the session running between $766.50 and $773.05. The Nasdaq 100 proxy (QQQ) ended at $741.21, off 0.84% from $747.46. The Dow tracker (DIA) closed at $514.30, down 0.71% from $518.00.
Rivian's decline was shallower than any of the three benchmarks. Carvana's was roughly three times the S&P 500's move and it closed nearer the bottom of its intraday range than the top. Single-session moves of this size tell you about the day's risk appetite, not about either company's prospects, and neither move came attached to disclosed company news in the material available.
What would actually settle the argument
For Rivian, the evidence is quarterly and physical. Production and delivery figures establish whether the volume ramp is real; the trend in gross margin establishes whether scale is translating into economics rather than just into units. Cash consumption establishes how much runway exists between here and the point where the first two questions are answered.
For Carvana, the disclosure to watch is mix and per-unit profitability. If new vehicles become a reported line item, the useful comparison is gross profit per unit on new versus used, and whether total retail units accelerate rather than simply shifting from one category to the other. A retailer that adds a lower-margin product line and grows total gross profit has done something valuable. One that cannibalizes its own higher-margin business has not.
Neither company's case rests on the current quote. Both rest on operating data that has not been published yet, which is exactly what makes an "under the radar" framing possible — and exactly why the framing stops working the moment that data lands.
Key facts
- RIVN last close: 15.02, -0.79%, as of 20:00 GMT Sept. 23, 2026
- CVNA last close: 63.95, -2.22%, as of 20:00 GMT Sept. 23, 2026
- Carvana's shift: Expanding from used-vehicle retail into new-vehicle sales
- Benchmark day: SPY -0.72%, QQQ -0.84%, DIA -0.71%
Frequently asked questions
What did the Motley Fool article actually argue?
It named Rivian and Carvana as two under-the-radar auto stocks. The argument was that investors have overlooked Rivian because it is in the very early innings of its story, and that many do not yet understand what Carvana's move into new-vehicle sales means for the business. No price targets or financial projections were attached to that framing.
Where did RIVN and CVNA close on Sept. 23, 2026?
Rivian last traded at 15.02, down 0.79% from a prior close of 15.14, with a session range of 14.80 to 15.17. Carvana closed at 63.95, down 2.22% from 65.40, ranging between 62.15 and 65.04. Both quotes are as of the last trade at 20:00 GMT, with the market closed.
Why does selling new cars change Carvana's economics?
New-vehicle retail generally carries thinner front-end margin per unit than used, because pricing is more transparent and supply comes from manufacturers rather than auctions. The offset is volume and predictable sourcing, pushed through infrastructure the company already built, plus financing and service revenue attached to each customer relationship.
What does 'early innings' mean for an EV maker?
It means production volume has not yet reached the level the fixed cost base was designed for, so each vehicle absorbs a heavier share of depreciation and overhead than it eventually will. The stock behaves more like a claim on future execution than on current cash flow, which raises both the potential return and the risk of failure.
Do Rivian and Carvana share the same risks?
Not really. Rivian's outcome depends on manufacturing: throughput, component costs, battery economics and capital access. Carvana's depends on retail and credit: inventory turns, cost of funds and loan performance. They share exposure to overall vehicle demand and financing costs, but the core drivers are almost entirely separate.
What numbers should investors track from here?
For Rivian: quarterly production and delivery counts, gross margin per vehicle, and cash burn against remaining runway. For Carvana: total retail units, the mix between new and used vehicles, and gross profit per unit on each. Those reported figures, not commentary, will determine whether either thesis holds.
