Abel's First 13F Cuts 16 Positions, Leaving OMAH to Follow

Greg Abel’s first full quarter managing Berkshire Hathaway’s equity portfolio eliminated sixteen positions in a single 13F filing, forcing the Buffett-replicating OMAH ETF — trading at 18.40, down 0.70% as of 20:00 GMT on Aug. 20, 2026 — to reshape holdings its shareholders assumed were fixed.

The pitch behind a Berkshire Hathaway replication fund is simple enough to fit on a napkin: let someone else do the thinking, then own what they own. That pitch just met its first real stress test. Greg Abel’s first full quarter in charge of Berkshire’s equity portfolio wiped out sixteen positions in a single sweep, according to the latest 13F filing — and the ETF built to shadow that portfolio, OMAH, is only now transmitting the consequences to shareholders.

OMAH last traded at 18.40, down 0.70% on the day, against a previous close of 18.53, with an intraday range of 18.40 to 18.58 as of 20:00 GMT on Aug. 20, 2026. Berkshire Hathaway’s Class B shares (BRK.B) were at 496.86, off 0.55% from a 499.62 close, ranging 496.48 to 500.44. Both were modestly softer on a broadly red tape: the S&P 500 tracker SPY fell 0.84% to $762.60, QQQ slipped 0.72% to $710.91, and DIA dropped 1.25% to $527.59.

Why sixteen exits in one filing is a different kind of event

A 13F is the quarterly disclosure that large U.S. institutional managers must file listing their reportable equity holdings. It is backward-looking by design — the positions shown were held as of quarter-end, and the filing lands weeks later. That lag has always been the structural flaw in any copycat strategy. You do not learn what changed until the change is already history.

Usually the lag is tolerable, because the underlying portfolio barely moves. Berkshire’s reputation was built on holding periods measured in decades, and a replication fund could sit largely still between filings without drifting far from its target. Sixteen simultaneous exits break that assumption. It is the difference between tracking a slow-moving benchmark and tracking a manager actively rebuilding a book.

The 24/7 Wall St report frames this as the Buffett portfolio disappearing one filing at a time. That is the right way to think about the risk. Nobody who bought a Berkshire-mirroring product was underwriting Abel’s stock-picking record. They were underwriting Buffett’s. The name on the door has changed, and the filings are now the mechanism by which that change gets delivered.

What a replication ETF can and cannot do about it

Mechanically, a fund that tracks disclosed 13F holdings has three unattractive choices when the target portfolio turns over hard.

Follow late. Sell what Berkshire already sold, at prices set weeks after Berkshire’s trades. If the exits were well-timed, the copier captures the disclosure but not the execution.
Anticipate. Guess at the next move between filings. That is active management, and it is not what the label promises.
Hold stale. Keep positions Berkshire no longer owns until the next filing confirms the change. The portfolio then diverges from its stated reference.

None of these is a scandal. All of them are tracking error — the gap between what a fund holds and what it says it tracks. The point is that this tracking error is not a rounding issue introduced by fees or trading costs. It is generated directly by the pace at which the underlying manager reshuffles, and that pace has just accelerated.

OMAH’s income overlay adds a second layer. Funds of this type commonly pair equity exposure with an options strategy to generate distributions, because Berkshire itself pays no dividend on its common stock. That means two things can move independently: the equity sleeve, which chases the 13F, and the income sleeve, which depends on the volatility and liquidity of whatever names sit in the portfolio at the time. Swap sixteen positions out and the option-writing profile underneath changes with them.

The succession question stops being theoretical

Funds of this type commonly pair equity exposure with an options strategy to generate distributions, because Berkshire itself pays no dividend on its common stock.

For years, Berkshire succession was discussed as a governance abstraction — a question about who signs the annual letter. This filing converts it into a portfolio fact. Abel is not obliged to preserve his predecessor’s book as a museum piece, and a large one-quarter cleanup is a legitimate thing for an incoming allocator to do. But it does mean that anyone holding a Berkshire-copying instrument now owns a live judgment on a new manager, refreshed quarterly, with a reporting delay built in.

The market reaction so far is unremarkable. BRK.B’s 0.55% decline is milder than the Dow tracker’s 1.25% drop and slightly better than SPY’s 0.84% fall, which suggests the equity itself is trading with the tape rather than on the filing. OMAH’s 0.70% slide sits between the two. Neither price is signaling alarm as of the last trade.

What holders should actually watch from here

Price is the least informative thing on this list. The mechanics matter more.

The next 13F. One heavy-turnover quarter can be housekeeping. Two in a row is a style. The comparison to make is exits versus new positions — a portfolio being pruned toward cash reads very differently from one being redeployed.
How fast OMAH rebalances after a filing. The interval between disclosure and the fund’s own holdings update is the honest measure of how much Buffett-shaped exposure a holder is really getting.
Distribution consistency. If the income component is tied to writing options on the underlying names, a materially different roster of holdings can change what the strategy is able to generate. Watch the payout pattern, not the marketing.
Concentration. Sixteen removals mechanically concentrate what remains, unless replaced. Concentration cuts both ways, and it changes the risk profile of a product often sold as a conservative proxy.

The broader lesson about outsourcing conviction

Replication products have proliferated because they solve a real problem: most investors cannot research a hundred companies, and following a respected allocator is a rational shortcut. The catch is that the shortcut is only as durable as the person at the far end of it. When that person changes, the product does not change its ticker, its fee, or its pitch — but the thing it is tracking is no longer the thing that earned the reputation.

That is the situation in front of OMAH shareholders. The fund still does what it says. It copies the Berkshire portfolio as disclosed. What has shifted is who is building that portfolio, and how often it will be rebuilt. Sixteen positions vanished in one quarter under new management. The filings will keep arriving, and each one is now a piece of news rather than a formality.

Key facts

OMAH last price: 18.40, -0.70% as of 20:00 GMT, Aug. 20, 2026
BRK.B last price: 496.86, -0.55% (prev close 499.62)
Positions exited: 16, in Greg Abel’s first full quarter running the portfolio
Market backdrop: SPY -0.84% to $762.60; DIA -1.25% to $527.59

Frequently asked questions

What is OMAH designed to do?

OMAH is an exchange-traded fund built to mirror the Berkshire Hathaway equity portfolio as disclosed in regulatory filings, typically paired with an income overlay because Berkshire common stock pays no dividend. Holders get exposure modeled on Berkshire’s disclosed positions rather than a direct stake in the holding company itself.

Why does a 13F filing matter to an ETF holder?

A 13F is the quarterly disclosure large U.S. institutional managers file listing reportable equity holdings as of quarter-end. Because it arrives weeks after the period it covers, any fund copying those holdings acts on information that is already dated, meaning trades happen at prices different from the original manager’s.

How many positions did Greg Abel exit?

Sixteen positions were eliminated in a single sweep during Abel’s first full quarter running Berkshire’s portfolio, according to the latest 13F filing. That level of turnover is unusual for a portfolio historically known for very long holding periods, and it is the reason replication funds now face meaningful adjustment.

How did OMAH and Berkshire shares trade on the day?

As of the last trade at 20:00 GMT on Aug. 20, 2026, OMAH was at 18.40, down 0.70% from a previous close of 18.53, within a range of 18.40 to 18.58. Berkshire Class B shares were at 496.86, down 0.55% from 499.62, ranging 496.48 to 500.44.

What is tracking error and why is it relevant here?

Tracking error is the gap between what a fund holds and the reference portfolio it claims to follow. For a 13F-based strategy, it grows whenever the underlying manager trades quickly, because the copying fund cannot act until disclosure. Sixteen simultaneous exits widen that gap considerably.

What should holders monitor next?

The next 13F filing, to see whether heavy turnover repeats or was one-off housekeeping; the speed at which the fund updates its own holdings after each disclosure; the consistency of distributions if the income sleeve depends on options written on the underlying names; and rising concentration among remaining positions.

Sources

Warning: The Buffett Portfolio Your OMAH ETF Copies Is Disappearing One 13F at a Time — 24/7 Wall St

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